Humberto Leal sits on death row awaiting execution by the people of Texas. He was convicted of the horrific sexual assault and brutal murder of sixteen-year-old Andrea Sauceda. This post is long. More significantly, this case is not for the faint of heart. You might want to take a pass on this one.
I will present the defense case first, followed by the prosecution case as presented in an appellate decision. I obtained the defense case from Humberto Leal's web site.
In order to convict Humberto Leal of capital murder, the prosecution was required to prove that Mr. Leal kidnapped and sexually assaulted Adria Sauceda before she died -- accusations Mr. Leal vehemently denies. To prove these elements, the prosecution relied on antiquated and meaningless DNA testing, and forensic "evidence" that is now universally recognized as inconclusive junk science. This evidence included the use of "luminol" to prove the presence of blood and the use of "bite mark" evidence to prove identity.
Since the state's own witnesses testified that several men had sexually assaulted Ms. Sauceda on the night of her death, the state focused on the testimony of a DNA expert and so-called "bite mark" evidence to show Mr. Leal sexually assaulted the victim.
Megan Clement, a DNA expert who testified for the prosecution, concluded that the victim was a "possible donor" of "very minute" blood spots discovered on Mr. Leal's underwear. Dr. Elizabeth Johnson, a forensic scientist, has since concluded that Ms. Clement followed deeply flawed testing protocols and provided misleading testimony. Most importantly, the outmoded technology used by Clement could not have established to any degree of certainty that Ms. Sauceda's blood was, in fact, on Mr. Leal's underwear. As the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has since recognized, "with the science available at the time of trial in 1994, no one could credibly say that an unknown blood sample came from a given individual." Current technology, however, would permit an accurate analysis of the bloodstain in order to exclude the victim as a donor. Such a result would inevitably undercut the only rational basis for the jury's verdict. Mr. Leal has asked the state to release the evidence so that it can be subjected to modern DNA testing, yet Texas has refused.
The prosecution also produced a "bite mark expert" to testify that Mr. Leal's teeth had a unique pattern consistent with one of the bite marks found on the victim's body. The scientific community has since recognized that such bite mark comparisons are incapable of identifying an individual to the exclusion of all others. A 2009 report issued by the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences concluded that "different experts provide widely differing results and a high percentage of false positive matches of bite marks." Another study revealed a 63% false positive rate when attempting to use bite mark evidence to establish identity. Indeed, several men have recently been exonerated after so-called "bite mark experts" linked them to the crime. If the police investigating Ms. Sauceda's murder had taken saliva samples of the suspected bite mark, they could have performed DNA testing on the samples. Inexplicably, no samples were taken.
Finally, the prosecution claimed that luminol testing revealed the presence of blood in Mr. Leal's car—evidence they claimed was dispositive to prove that Mr. Leal kidnapped the victim. In fact, luminol reacts to substances that are not blood at all, including soils, detergents, bleaches, carpet, metal objects, tools, plastic panels, wood, and vegetable compounds. Since Luminol testing is so unreliable, and can be so misleading to the jury, courts frequently exclude the results of Luminol testing unless additional, confirmatory tests have been done to determine the presence of human blood. In Mr. Leal's case, however, no confirmatory tests were performed and defense counsel permitted the state's unfounded assertions to stand without any objections.
Current DNA technology is capable of excluding the victim as a donor to the bloodstain found on Mr. Leal's underwear. There was no other reliable forensic evidence connecting him to the offense.
The tragic final hours of sixteen-year-old Adrea Sauceda's life started at an outdoor party in San Antonio, Texas. A witness observed Sauceda, apparently intoxicated and partially undressed, in the middle of a circle of men who were taking turns "on top of her." Another witness testified that an unidentified male invited him to have intercourse with Sauceda. The same witness testified that he later observed another man carrying a disoriented Sauceda to a truck, where he "had his way with her." On direct appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals summarized the evidence of the events that followed:
The twenty-three-year-old appellant [Leal] was also at the party. At some point the intoxicated but conscious victim was placed in appellant's car. Appellant and the victim left together in appellant's car.
About thirty minutes later, appellant's brother arrived at the party in a car which came to a screeching halt. Appellant's brother was very excited or hysterical. Appellant's brother started yelling to the people left at the party, "What the hell happened!" Appellant's brother was yelling that appellant came home with blood on him saying he had killed a girl. Witnesses Torres and Ortega were present when appellant's brother made these statements. Shortly thereafter appellant's brother left in a rush.
Several of the party members went looking for the victim in the same area where the party was. They found her nude body lying face-up on a dirt road. They noticed the victim's head had been bashed in and it was bleeding. Her head was flinching or jerking. These party members called the police.
There was a bloody and broken stick approximately 14 to 16 inches long with a screw at the end of it protruding from the victim's vagina. Another 4 to 5 inch piece of the stick was lying to the left side of the victim's skull. The police made a videotape of the crime scene portions of which were admitted into evidence.
Later that day, the police questioned appellant. Appellant gave two voluntary statements. In appellant's first statement he said he was with the victim in his car when she began hitting him and the steering wheel causing him to hit a curb. Appellant attempted to calm her down but the victim leaped from appellant's car and ran away. Appellant claimed he sat in his car and waited about ten or fifteen minutes to see if the victim would return and when she did not he went home.
After giving this statement, appellant was informed that his brother had also given a statement. Appellant then gave another statement. In this statement, appellant claimed he followed the victim when she got out of his car and ran away. Appellant claimed the victim attacked him. Appellant pushed her and she fell to the ground. When she did not get up appellant attempted to wake her but could not. He then looked at her nose and saw bubbles. Appellant stated he got scared, went home, prayed on the side of his mom's bed and told family members what had happened, claiming it was just an accident. After giving this statement an officer gave appellant a ride home.
The police searched appellant's house. The police seized a blouse which contained several blood stains, hair and fibers. This blouse was later identified as belonging to the victim. The police also seized appellant's clothing from the night before. Appellant was arrested later that afternoon at his home.
Appellant's car was also impounded. The police conducted Luminol tests of the passenger door to determine whether any blood was evident. Blood stains were discovered on the passenger door and seat. Detectives testified that the blood stains were streaked in a down-ward motion, indicating that the blood had been wiped off. There was insufficient residue to conduct a blood typing of the stains on the vehicle. Other DNA evidence was found on the underwear appellant was wearing that night. That evidence consisted of blood as well as bodily fluid. The DNA test did not preclude the victim's blood type from the evidence tested.
Dr. DiMaio, the medical examiner who performed the autopsy, testified about the victim's injuries and cause of death. DiMaio testified that even though the victim was intoxicated when she received her injuries, she would have been aware of what was happening to her. In addition to the victim's massive head injuries, DiMaio testified about injuries the victim received to her chest and shoulder which were consistent with having been inflicted by the stick found in the victim's vagina. DiMaio also testified about the defensive wounds the victim received to her hands trying to protect herself from some object. DiMaio also testified the victim was alive when the stick was placed in her vagina. The victim's neck also contained injuries consistent with manual strangulation.
DiMaio testified the victim received some of her injuries while standing up. The victim received her head injuries while lying flat. The injuries to the victim's head were due to blows from the front. These injuries were inconsistent with a fall. The victim's head injuries were consistent with the victim lying on the ground with somebody standing over her striking her. DiMaio testified the large rock could have delivered the injuries to the victim's head. Based on the injuries to the victim's head, DiMaio testified the victim would had to have been struck with the rock two or three times. DiMaio testified the victim died from blunt force trauma injuries to the head. DiMaio could not say for certain that the rock caused the injuries. He testified the victim was beaten about the face with a blunt object or more than one object which could have been the rock or something else. On cross-examination, DiMaio testified that one blow from the rock could have caused the victim's death.
DiMaio also testified about bite marks he found on the victim's left cheek, the right side of her neck and the left side of her chest. Another witness compared the bite marks on the victim's chest and neck with dental impressions of appellant's teeth. They matched.
I agree with Leal's supporters that the bite mark evidence is crap, and the Luminol evidence is ambiguous. I agree also that the DNA evidence found on his underwear is inconclusive. In the words of the appellate court: "The DNA test did not preclude the victim's blood type from the evidence tested." I will not use the bite marks, the Luminol, or the DNA results in my assessment of Humberto Leal's guilt / innocence.
No one disputes that Leal left the "party" with Sauceda. Leal's own testimony is that he chased her, pushed her while defending himself against her attack, and that she somehow died during the fall. I accept the medical examiner's testimony that she was killed due to blows from the front, and that the injuries were inconsistent with a fall to the ground. Coupled with the victim's blouse being found at Leal's house, I believe the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Humberto Leal murdered Adria Sauceda.
I am uncompelled by the defense claim for a new DNA test on the blood on Leal's underwear. Even if evidence were found to be something other than blood, or blood belonging to someone other than Leal, it would have no impact on my decision that Leal is factually guilty of the crime. I did not rely on the underwear, or the bite mark, or the Luminol when assessing his guilt / innocence.
Much of the debate surround the impending execution has to do with Leal's status as a foreign national. I'm not passing judgement on whether Leal was improperly denied access to a Mexican consulate, nor am I discounting the need for informing foreign nationals of their right to see their consulate. Instead, I limit my assessment to whether or not the person facing execution may be factually innocent.
Much of the debate surround the impending execution has to do with Leal's status as a foreign national. I'm not passing judgement on whether Leal was improperly denied access to a Mexican consulate, nor am I discounting the need for informing foreign nationals of their right to see their consulate. Instead, I limit my assessment to whether or not the person facing execution may be factually innocent.
In this case, I stand mute.
